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The Economics of Professional 
Journal Pricing 
Michael A. Stoller, Robert Christopherson, 
and Michael Miranda 
The problems of excessive inflation and price discrimination in journal 
pricing continue to plague libraries. In analyzing the causes of the cur-
rent crisis, the authors review and evaluate previous contributions to the 
literature on journal pricing with particular emphasis on the three types 
of price discrimination practiced by journal publishers. The authors sug-
gest that the monopoly power of commercial publishers, combined with 
a third-party payment system, are at the heart of the problem. They 
suggest solutions that involve providing appropriate incentives to jour-
nal users, adoption of more equitable pricing systems, and employing 
the potential monopoly purchasing power of library associations to lower 
prices. 
11 fter more than two decades of extraordinary inflation, pro-f~ssiona~ journal prices con-tinue to mcrease at rates sev-
eral times as high as the American 
economy's overall inflation rate and far 
higher than the rate of cost increase in the 
journal publishing industry.14 Academic 
economists, marketing researchers, librar-
ians, And paid economic consultants have 
undertaken economic analyses of journal 
markets in order to explain the high rates 
of price increase and the great extent of 
price discrimination against libraries and 
United States buyers in general. Some of 
the researchers subsequently recom-
mended solutions to library administra-
tors, and many of their suggestions are 
sound and practical.5-~ However, a nurn-
ber of the studies are fraught with ana-
lytical errors and recommendations that 
were either economically illogical, im-
practical, or both. The authors intend to 
summarize the literature in this area, cor-
rect the analysis, and provide practical 
policy recommendations for library ad-
ministrators based on what the applica-
tion of economic principles really tells us 
about the journal market situation. 
The Natural Monopoly Misconception 
Several researchers have analyzed the 
academic journal industry and labeled it 
a natural monopoly. Despite the research-
ers' claims, the academic journal indus-
try is not a natural monopoly.10-12 A natu-
ral monopoly is an industry in which the 
cost structure is such that the average pro-
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FIGURE 1 
Natural Monopoly-Declining per Unit Production Costs 
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duction cost per unit of the product con-
tinues to fall throughout as the firm's pro- . 
ductionincreases (see figure 1). Therefore, 
one firm can produce the entire industry 
output more cheaply than having a group 
of competing firms. Because large firms 
usually have production cost advantages 
over small ones, it becomes difficult for 
small firms to compete and for new firms 
to enter the industry successfully. 
The type of price discrimination 
practiced by journal publishers is 
perfectly legal because it is not 
aimed at putting anyone out of 
business or disadvantaging a 
particular group of buyer-resellers 
through a limited discounting 
program. 
Public utilities, such as electric, natu-
ral gas, and local telephone firms, are the 
classic examples of natural monopolies. 
The existence of natural monopolies is the 
justification for federal, state, and local 
governments granting public utilities 
franchised monopolies on the grounds 
that having more than one local electric, 
water, telephone, or natural gas supplier 
would be uneconomical. Competition in 
these industries would require duplica-
tion of transport and connection facilities 
throughout the service area and would 
be unnecessarily costly. Hence, state and 
local governments grant monopoly fran-
chises to utilities and then regulate their 
prices because there is no competition to 
keep the prices low. 
Certainly there are economies of scale 
that cause the average cost of journal pro-
duction to fall as output increases, mostly 
because of the high initial setup (i.e., first 
copy) or fixed costs. That is also true for 
the automobile industry, all of the other 
publishing industries, or any manufactur-
ing industry for that matter. Typically, cost 
per unit will fall as the firm expands, but 
only up to a particular output level. Be-
yond that production lev~l, per unit cost 
does not continue to fall and may even-
tually even increase. There is not a con-
tinuously declining cost curve that man-
dates that there can be only one efficient 
producer of the product, as would exist 
in a natural monopoly industry, hence the 
name "natural" monopoly. Firms simply 
must be large enough to produce effi-
ciently, and in the journal industry, as in 
most manufacturing industries, the state 
of technology is such that many firms can 
operate efficiently, each producing a small 
percentage of industry output at the mini-
mum average cost (i.e., cost per unit). 
However, the fact that the technological 
conditions for a natural monopoly do not 
exist in the journal publishing industry 
should not be interpreted to mean that 
there is no monopoly power in this in-
dustry. It is simply not a "natural" condi-
tion that is dictated by the state of tech-
nology. 
Price Discrimination in the Journal 
Publishing Industry 
A number of researchers have investi-
gated the issue of price discrimination or 
dual pricing in academic journals.13·17 
Price discrimination, in its simplest form, 
is charging different prices to different 
buyers for the same good or service. Jour-
nal pricing, however, is fraught with price 
discrimination of at least three different 
varieties, two of them more complex than 
the simplest form: 
1. Commercial and noncommercial 
journal publishers usually charge 
academic libraries considerably 
higher prices (often three times or 
more as high) than they do indi-
vidual subscribers for the same 
quantity of an identical product, i.e., 
a one-year journal subscription.18 
2. Western European journal publish-
ers usually charge American buy-
ers considerably higher prices than 
they do European subscribers for 
the same quantity of an identical 
product, after allowing for differ-
ences in shipping costs and the risks 
of exchange rate fluctuations.19·21 
3. Publishers, particularly commer-
cial firms, charge far higher 
prices for natural science and en-
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gineering journals than for jour-
nals in other fields, on a per page 
basis after allowing for any dif-
ferences in production and ship-
ping costs and costs associated 
with variation in the frequency of 
publication. 22-24 
Not surprisingly, economists are inter-
ested in these phenomena. In fact, that 
interest in price discrimination led at least 
one of this paper's authors to begin do-
ing research on the topic of journal pric-
ing. The authors will explore why price 
discrimination occurs in journal markets, 
and why it persists to such a great degree 
when it does not exist at all or in such a 
blatant manner in other goods markets. 
Several articles in library science jour-
nals simply restate the standard econom-
ics textbook list of conditions that are con-
ducive to the existence of long-term price 
discrimination.25 The authors assume that 
all of these conditions are met by the aca-
demic journal industry, without studying 
the situation in depth, because of the long 
history of price discrimination in this in-
dustry. These conditions include the fol-
lowing: 
1. There are different markets with sub-
stantially different price elasticities 
of demand (i.e., different degrees of 
responsiveness to changes in price) 
that may be identified and kept seg-
regated by the seller (for example, 
libraries versus individual subscrib-
ers or North American customers 
versus European customers). 
2. There are no effective markets for 
low-price buyers to resell to high-
price buyers. 
3. Competitors must not be able to un-
dersell the price discriminator in 
the market segment that is being 
charged the higher price (i.e., the 
seller must have monopoly power). 
4. The seller's cost of segregating the 
market must not be greater than the 
extra revenue generated from price 
discrimination. 
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5. The practice of price discrimination 
must not breed ill will among con-
sumers. 
6. The discrimination must not be 
illegal. 
Certainly most of these conditions must 
exist to some extent because price dis-
crimination persists, but it is worth study-
ing these conditions individually to see 
whether there is a possible chink in the 
publishers' armor through which those 
being discriminated against may be able 
to lessen the extent of price discrimina-
tion. Some libraries are finding effective 
ways to deal with this problem (e.g., 
forming purchasing consortiums or rais-
ing their elasticities of demand by shar-
ing journals or purchasing copies of in-
dividual articles rather than subscribing 
to a journal). The assumption that there 
is no ill will from price discrimination is 
certainly questionable. The question is 
whether such ill will can be transformed 
into an effective weapon against price 
discrimination. 
Edward Dyl implies that price dis-
crimination, as practiced by journal pub-
lishers, may be illegal under the prohibi-
tions of the Robinson-Patman Antitrust 
Act, and he notes that the federal govern-
ment has never tested this law's provi-
sions on the academic journal industry.26 
In fact, the Robinson-Patman Act could 
not possibly apply to journal price dis-
crimination because it is a piece of depres-
sion era legislation aimed at protecting 
small competitors from large ones (most 
notably from A&P, the retail giant of the 
1930s). It outlaws price discrimination 
only to the extent that large buyers can-
not be offered discounts that are not avail-
able to smaller buyers. The type of price 
discrimination practiced by journal pub-
lishers is perfectly legal because it is not 
aimed at putting anyone out of business 
or disadvantaging a particular group of 
buyer-resellers through a limited dis-
counting program. There is nothing ille-
gal in price discriminating against a 
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group of customers under the Robinson-
Patman Act, and it is a very common prac-
tice. For example, consider the variety of 
ticket prices charged by airlines or movie 
theaters for equal-quality seats. 
The Equity Question: Is Price 
Discrimination Fair? 
Publishers might argue that price dis-
crimination in journal pricing is fair based 
on the fact that library copies of journals 
are read much more frequently than in-
dividuals' copies and that photocopying 
from library copies is quite common, with 
no remuneration to the publisher. Welfare 
economists, aiming for efficient use of re-
sources, normally are most concerned 
about prices reflecting, and preferably 
equaling, the market value of the re-
sources that go into the production of a 
product; or more simply stated, they 
think that price should equal marginal 
production cost. However, many other in-
dividuals would no doubt be sympathetic 
to the concept of price reflecting the value 
of the product to the users, and they 
might argue that the total value of a li-
brary copy of a journal that is read by 
many readers is greater than the value of 
a personal copy that is read only by an 
individual subscriber. Therefore, they 
would claim that the library copy ought 
to sell for a higher price. This argument 
gains more strength if the readers of the 
library copy are able to make inexpensive 
personal photocopies of journal articles. 
If one agrees with the latter point of 
view and employs it as a justification for 
price discrimination, the logical extension 
is that a journal pricing system based on 
expected usage should exist. Publishers 
could charge college and university li-
braries according to the number of ex-
pected users. This number could be esti-
mated easily from the undergraduate and 
graduate enrollments, with graduate en-
rollments weighted more heavily in a 
simple pricing formula. One can argue 
the fine points of such a pricing system 
(e.g., should university or program en-
rollments be employed?), but enrollment 
data are normally available to library 
administrators who could then supply 
them to publishers. Although such a sys-
tem would not be perfectly fair, it would 
be considerably more equitable than the 
current two-price system which greatly 
disadvantages small college libraries with 
limited budgets that make more limited 
use of library journals than large research 
libraries which pay the same price. Sim-
ply basing journal prices on readily avail-
able total institutional enrollments (per-
haps using enrollment intervals) would 
be more equitable than the current two-
price system, for which there is little eq-
uity-based justification. Indeed, the ad-
vent of the electronic journal, with the 
possibility that its pricing will eventually 
be based strictly according to usage, may 
lead to the most equitable pricing system 
as well as the most efficient use of 
society's resources. Subscribers can be 
charged for and will receive only the ar-
ticles they plan to read, saving resources 
for both producer and consumer. Charges 
will reflect the number of readers because 
each reader will be charged individually. 
Extensive pay-per-use operations are al-
ready in place in many libraries. 
Industry Structure and Unique 
Industry Characteristics 
Given the preceding criticism of much of 
the economic analysis that researchers 
have carried out to date on the journal 
industry, the next logical step is to de-
scribe the actual economic structure of 
this industry. More to the point, what is 
there in the structure and conduct of this 
industry that makes it perform the way 
it does? 
First, there appears to be a great deal 
of monopoly power in this industry, al-
though it is not a natural monopoly. 27• 28 
Given the uniqueness of individual jour-
nal articles and the existence of copyright 
laws, there appears to be no direct com-
petition among publishers of different 
journals in the same academic field. Ev-
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ery issue of every journal is unique. Be-
cause authors of research articles are nor-
mally expected to read and cite all articles 
relevant to their research topics, they can-
not omit reading an article in favor of a 
close substitute. There are no substitutes, 
unlike the magazine market, for example. 
Whereas Newsweek, Time, and U.S. News 
compete with and are considered to be 
substitutes for each other by most news 
magazine subscribers, the American Eco-
nomic Review and the Journal of Political 
Economy are not really competitors. Li-
braries must buy both journals, and eco-
nomic researchers must read the relevant 
articles in both. Therefore, every pub-
lisher of a major journal should be con-
Monopoly and third-party payment 
are the two key characteristics that 
explain pricing behavior and the 
apparently high price levels in the 
academic journal industry. 
sidered a monopolist. In this sense, the 
journal publishing industry is truly 
unique. There is a captive audience for 
all major journals. 
A second important and somewhat 
unique characteristic of the industry is 
that, to the extent that journal marketing 
is primarily directed at librarians, the de-
mander and ultimate user is neither or-
dering nor paying for the product; those 
activities rest with the library. 29 The im-
portance of this characteristic can be seen 
by looking at a similar industry-phar-
maceuticals. Many, if not most, people 
who use prescription drugs do not pay 
directly for them; insurance companies 
do. It is no coincidence that prescription 
drug prices are high; the rate of drug price 
inflation persistently has been above the 
United States's average rate of inflation, 
and the drug industry consistently has 
had average profits two to three times the 
rate of return of the average American 
manufacturing industry. Demand for a 
product will always be greater when the 
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user is spending someone else's money. 
AlthQugh this point is not made in many 
standard economics texts, it is acknowl-
edged widely by economists. Professional 
journals and pharmaceuticals are two of 
the few industries in which this purchas-
ing situation exists, along with other sec-
tors of the health care industry. 
Monopoly and third-party payment 
are the two key characteristics that ex-
plain pricing behavior and the apparently 
high price levels in the academic journal 
industry. A third unique characteristic is 
that the industry contains many non-
profit producers who ''bundle" journals 
along with other products as part of mem-
bership packages in a manner that law 
enforcement agencies might consider to 
be an antitrust violation in profit-oriented 
industries. Membership and the purchase 
of several journals become essentially an 
ali-or-nothing proposition, hence the term 
bundling. This practice also makes it dif-
ficult for researchers to determine the in-
dividual journal prices. The American 
Economic Association, for example, in-
cludes three major journals (thirteen is-
sues) as part of an annual association 
membership for fees ranging between $47 
and $66 in 1994 (depending on the 
member's income level). Members can 
save six dollars by refusing one of the 
journals, but they cannot save more than 
six dollars, although the association 
claims that 30 percent of the membership 
fee goes to pay for each of the three jour-
nals. 
The Effect of Structural 
Characteristics on Performance 
Given these unique structural character-
istics, the authors next attempted to de-
termine what effect they have on perfor-
mance in the academic journal industry. 
The authors know that price discrimina-
tion requires the presence of monopoly 
power, or otherwise competitors will un-
dercut the high prices charged to the buy-
ers who are being discriminated 
against-in this case, libraries. The exist-
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ence of monopoly power also means that 
if the price discrimination does breed ill 
will, there may be little that the buyers 
can do. This is especially true if the buy-
ers (i.e., libraries) are not the ones request-
ing and using the product. In this mar-
ket, ill will clearly exists, but it rarely af-
fects the pricing behavior of the sellers un-
less it is accompanied by hostile actions 
on the part of libraries. Therefore, it 
should not be surprising that there has 
been a persistent tendency for the most 
expensive journals to have the largest-
percentage price increases.30 
As several writers note, the monopoly 
power of journal publishers leads to 
highly inelastic demand from research 
libraries, in part because faculty demand, 
and will not accept substitutes for, spe-
cific journals which the faculty do not pay 
for and for which they rarely know the 
price.31 -34 Meanwhile, individual sub-
scriber demand is much more elastic re-
garding purchasing personal subscrip-
tions because individual subscribers can 
photocopy articles at little or no cost in 
their libraries or obtain copies through in-
terlibrary loan, whereas personal sub-
scriptions usually must be paid for out of 
their own household budgets. 
Hence, a perfect scenario exists for 
publishers to implement price discrimi-
nation. Publishers' claims that the large 
number of readers of library copies of 
journals justifies a higher price should be 
disregarded. One might draw a parallel 
between this situation and the American 
Medical Association's efforts to justify 
high prices charged by medical doctors 
on the basis that they must invest so many 
years in training. Such moral justification 
has nothing to do with the price level or 
pricing structure. A firm can only charge 
high prices and price-discriminate if mar-
ket conditions allow. The equity-based ar-
guments of the publishers, whether they 
provide moral justification for the pric-
ing practices or not, are beside the point. 
Photocopy pricing and quality may be 
correlated over time with the extent of 
price discrimination in journal pricing as 
S.J. Leibowitz suggested, in that the avail-
ability of inexpensive, good-quality pho-
tocopies of library journal articles may 
keep personal journal subscription prices 
low. However, this cannot explain fully 
why price discrimination against librar-
ies exists to the extent that it does in the 
journal publishing industry.35 
Similarly, much of the price differences 
among journals in different academic dis-
ciplines appears to be the result of price 
discrimination by discipline rather than 
differences in production cost, although 
the supporting evidence for this state-
ment is limited and further investigation 
is needed.36,37 Journals in the natural sci-
ences and engineering fields are far more 
expensive than journals in other fields . 
When seeking an explanation, one often 
hears that the printing cost of the math-
ematical symbols and illustrations is the 
reason for the high price. Yet, the price 
differentials appear to be far higher than 
printing cost differentials would seem to 
justify, and art journals, with expensive 
illustrations, are not particularly high 
priced.38 
The answer to the question on price 
differences by discipline may be much 
simpler and quite consistent with what 
economic theory would predict. Publish-
ers charge more for natural science jour-
nals because they are able to do so. As 
one commercial publisher marketing ex-
ecutive (who prefers anonymity) of a 
major for-profit journal publisher stated 
in an interview, publishers charge higher 
prices for science journals because natu-
ral science research is considered more 
urgent and is far better funded than other 
types of research. Scientists need these 
journals, and they have funds to pay for 
them. It is a simple case of maximizing 
profit by charging higher prices in mar-
kets where demand is inelastic. It should 
also not be surprising that commercial 
publishers are more dominant in science 
and engineering than in other disciplines. 
One study found that commercial firms 
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published over 63 percent of the chemis-
try journals that a particular rna jor re-
search library purchased, and these firms 
received almost 80 percent of the sub-
scription money paid for chemistry jour-
nals by that library.39 
Although commercial publishers claim 
that their prices and profits are not ex-
cessive, there is good reason to believe 
that the commercial journal publishing in-
dustry is highly profitable and has be-
come more profitable during the past two 
decades of rapid price increases and in-
creasing price discrirnination.40 Economic 
Consulting Services (ECS) points to "the 
rapidly growing disparity between the 
costs of publishing and subscription 
prices charged to libraries."41 The afore-
mentioned journal marketing executive 
pointed out the ideal market situation in 
which commercial journal publishers ex-
ist, despite facing rapidly rising costs. 
They not only have a monopoly, but their 
customer base is prepaid and virtually 
guaranteed for years into the future. The 
publishers know exactly how many cop-
ies to print, incur no debt up front, receive 
no returns from bookstores, and never 
have to pay for a second press run~ In 
many ways, the journal publishing busi-
ness is far more lucrative than the book 
An increasing number of institu-
tions are ordering individual 
photocopies of articles from the 
more expensive joumals as needed, 
through services provided by CARL 
Uncover and First Article, among 
others. 
publishing business, he noted. A quote 
from an interview with the late Robert 
Maxwell, former owner of Pergamon 
Journals, in which Maxwell called his 
journal operations a "cash generator 
twice over," supports the view of the mar-
keting executive.42 
When asked to explain the disparity 
between library and individual subscrip-
tion prices, the marketing executive's re-
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sponse was simply that he believed com-
mercial publishers charge the maximum 
that they can get. They know that indi-
viduals will not pay the prices that librar-
ies are charged. This is the same conclu-
sion that noted economist Fritz Machlup 
reached regarding the pricing strategies 
of scholarly book publishers almost two 
decades ago.43 
Policy Recommendations-What 
Libraries Should Do 
Economists offer a variety of recommen-
dations to libraries based on their analy-
ses. Unfortunately, not all of them are 
practical. Rather than criticize the imprac-
tical recommendations of others, the au-
thors will see what their analysis sug-
gests. 
Because the journal pricing problem 
· stems from the existence of monopoly 
power, the authors first considered ways 
of dealing with such power. Society has 
several means of dealing with monopoly 
situations. Two of these, government 
ownership and economic regulation such 
as government-imposed price ceilings, 
are impractical because the federal gov-
ernment is not about to take over journal 
publishing firms or begin regulating their 
prices. 
A third method of dealing with a mo-
nopoly is to create competition for the 
monopolist by finding or creating a sub-
stitute product. This could involve find-
ing ways to meet the demand for particu-
lar journal articles without having the li-
brary buy the journals. A few colleges 
appear to be purchasing alternative jour-
nals instead of those with the highest 
prices, but this is not a feasible solution 
for research libraries. An increasing num-
ber of institutions are ordering individual 
photocopies of articles from the more ex-
pensive journals as needed, through ser-
vices provided by CARL Uncover and 
First Article, among others. However, 
commercial journal publishers could set 
the copying fees at levels that will maxi-
mize their profits, making potential long-
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term savings from this alternative prob-
lematic. 
Publishers should be told when they 
lose customers as a result of their high 
prices. They must realize that, despite mo-
nopoly power, demand is relatively elas-
tic as prices rise. If a subscription is can-
celled because of price or budgetary prob-
lems, publishers should be informed as 
to the reason, even if it is done with a form 
letter. Some researchers believe that pub-
lishers may finally be starting to receive 
this message from the "massive serials 
cancellations programs undertaken by 
research libraries" in the United States 
over the past few years. 44 
In a study commissioned by the Asso-
ciation of Research Libraries (ARL), ECS 
suggested that professional associations 
create new journals as nonprofit alterna-
tives to commercial publishers and that 
these associations and the ARL should 
also encourage low-price profit-seeking 
publishers to create additional jour-
nals.45A6 Others have called for universi-
ties as well as learned professional asso-
ciations to enter the journal publishing 
business.47 Many economists believe that 
in a free market system, in an industry 
where excessive profits are being made, 
new firms will be drawn into the indus-
try because of the strong profit incentives, 
even if they must overcome the consider-
able monopoly power of the highly prof-
itable existing firms. That is usually true, 
but sometimes it takes several decades for 
the new entrants to gain a foothold. The 
authors therefore encourage the ARL to 
facilitate this process, and the best pros-
pects for entry may be small established 
American commercial publishers who are 
willing to work with professional asso-
ciations that can guarantee a market for 
their products. 
ARL has, thus far, taken a slightly dif-
ferent approach to the journal pricing 
problem. In a recent collaborative effort, 
the Association of American Universities 
(AAU) and the ARL set up three task 
forces to: (1) study acquisition and distri-
bution of foreign language and area stud-
ies materials; (2) develop a national strat-
egy for managing scientific and techni-
cal information; and (3) study intellectual 
property rights in an electronic environ-
ment. Those task forces, recognizing the 
growing monopoly power of a few Euro-
pean publishers and the extent to which 
they have a captive university market, 
concluded that additional competition 
must be "injected" into the journal mar-
ket.48 Task force members believe that the 
advent of electronic journals and data-
bases provides new opportunities for 
low-cost journal market entry by profes-
sional societies and university presses 
with electronic links to regional and na-
tional distribution centers where all 
scholars may access any journals from 
their desktop computers.49 
Closely tied to these suggestions, the 
task forces noted, is the need to change 
copyright practices so that the federal 
government, universities, and faculty 
members somehow retain copyright con-
trol over the work that they either fund 
or do themselves. This is in contrast to 
the current practice of signing over copy-
right ownership to the journal publish-
ers. The task forces recognized that, as 
noted above, the lower costs of electronic 
publishing will not be passed on as lower 
prices to subscribers by commercial pub-
lishers unless the competitive situation is 
changed. However, as the task forces also 
noted, such changes will require coopera-
tion among scholars, universities, and the 
federal government, who will have to 
present a united front in order to force 
publishers to give up copyright control 
of journal articles. These changes may 
also require modification of university 
scholarship requirements for tenure and 
promotion. Tenure and promotion com-
mittees must be willing to recognize fully 
publications in the new journals, both 
electronic and print, that university 
presses and others are being encouraged 
to start. Gaining such total cooperation, 
if that is possible, would require a great 
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deal of work by a powerful central coor-
dinating organization, as the task forces 
recognized. This idea essentially encom-
passes another economic solution to the 
monopoly problem-bilateral monopoly. 
Long employed by union organizers, 
bilateral monopoly consists of meeting 
monopoly power with opposing mo-
nopoly power. Industrial organization 
economist H. Craig Petersen, in an excel-
lent study of factors affecting journal pric-
ing, states, "Another group that could in-
fluence journal pricing is library associa-
tions."50 He then suggests that "at the very 
least, publishers whose prices are signifi-
cantly higher than charges for compa-
rable publications should be asked to jus-
tify their pricing practices by providing 
detailed information on costs."51 The au-
thors concur, but take the suggestion fur-
ther. As organizations representing the 
customers who are discriminated against, 
the ALA and ARL, with the help of the 
AAU, can act as monopoly buyers, devel-
oping cooperative purchasing arrange-
ments (which has begun to occur through 
other organizations), as suggested by 
Chressanthis and Chressanthis, or em-
ploying threats of collective action such 
as boycotts against the publishers who are 
the greatest offenders in setting high or 
discriminatory prices that they cannot or 
will not attempt to justify. 52 The ECS study 
suggests that the ARL should act as a lob-
byist to find new publication channels.53 
That is not much different from putting 
the squeeze on offending publishers di-
rectly. The ARL-AAU task force reports 
have similar implications. In essence, car-
rying out the recommendations hinges on 
the coordination of a massive cooperative 
effort by scholars, government, universi-
ties, and university presses that amounts 
to the formation of a united front or ef-
fective monopoly to wrest control of copy-
rights and scholarly publication from a 
small group of commercial publishers. 
This solution could work, but the ob-
stacles are many, not the least of which is 
the magnitude of the necessary coordina-
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tion effort and the need to change the aca-
demic prestige and reward system to in-
clude electronic, and other less expensive 
journals. 
As noted above, the second problem 
characteristic in the journal market is 
"third-party payment." The demanders 
and users are not paying for the journals 
that they request and use. In dealing with 
that problem, the following suggestion 
will have positive results ultimately. Give 
the researchers who request and use the 
journals an economic incentive to care 
about the prices and the library expendi-
tures in this area. Force them to deal with 
the library's budget problems by provid-
ing a budget for journals in their disci-
plines and supplying them with a list of 
subscriptions and prices. Let them help 
to choose which journals they want 
within the library's budget constraint. If 
they refuse involvement, library admin-
Price discrimination is not illegal, 
but neither are consumers' attempts 
to avoid or combat it. Price discrimi-
nation and rapidly rising prices are 
breeding ill will among library 
administrators, and it might be 
helpful to their cause if such 
feelings were shared by the faculty 
who read and publish in the 
journals. 
istrators will make the decisions and fac-
ulty members will have few grounds for 
complaint. The tighter the budget con-
straints, the more interested they should 
be in dealing with the problem as sub-
scriptions are cancelled. Once again, note 
Petersen's findings that "rapid price in-
creases are not inevitable .... ," and "If 
prices of certain journals become too high, 
scholars could use their professional as-
sociations to establish other, less expen-
sive publications. The problem is that 
scholars have little incentive to do so."54 
Jean Walstrom Haley and James Talaga, 
in a survey of libraries' efforts to deal with 
the journal price inflation problem, found 
January 1996 
that university librarians reported that 
shifting journal selection to faculty, can-
celling subscriptions in protest of price in-
creases, and filing individual complaints 
with publishers were thought to be the 
most successful remedies by those who 
had employed them, but few libraries had 
done so.55 Haley and Talaga also sug-
gested attempting to negotiate prices with 
publishers and sharing resources among 
libraries. 
ECS suggested involving university 
leaders and professional societies in this 
effort. 56 The key is to provide the right in-
centives to all parties, the demanders as 
well as the publishers. Journal users must 
think they have a real stake in the out-
come of the process. Although the effect 
of involving these additional parties can-
not be forecast precisely, providing the 
correct incentives will usually result in 
positive outcomes, whether they be new, 
less expensive journals, as Petersen, ECS, 
and AA U-ARL suggested, or lower prices 
for existing journals. 
In addition, consumer groups can try 
to counter price discrimination by chang-
ing one or more of the aforementioned 
six conditions ·necessary to its mainte-
nance. Perhaps effective reseller markets 
may be established. Despite publishers' 
printed statements that individual sub-
scribers may not pass their journals on to 
libraries for other readers, that proscrip-
tion is of dubious legal validity and pub-
lishers have never tested it in court. The 
authors believe publishers are not anx-
ious to test it. Illegal duplication of a prod-
uct for profit is one matter. Selling or let-
ting others use a product that you pur-
chased is certainly another matter, and 
this practice has never been illegal in the 
United States. 
Price discrimination is not illegal, but 
neither are consumers' attempts to avoid 
or combat it. Price discrimination and 
rapidly rising prices are breeding ill will 
among library administrators, and it 
might be helpful to their cause if such feel-
ings were shared by the faculty who read 
and publish in the journals. To that end, 
the ARL should continue to publish price 
indices and publicize the price differen-
tials between low-priced and high-priced 
publishers. 
Ironically, some publishers claim, and 
researchers acknowledge, that subscrip-
tion cancellations, which appear to have 
sharply accelerated recently, force them 
to raise prices further to maintain profit 
margins.57-59 Although such actions are 
neither unheard of nor unjustified, they 
only succeed if the remaining demand is 
inelastic so that further price increases do 
not lead to additional cancellations.60 
Such inelasticity is a further indication of 
monopoly power, thereby leading to the 
conclusion that journal publishers think 
that they have considerable monopoly 
power despite the subscription cancella-
tions. 
Summary and Conclusions 
An economic analysis of the journal in-
dustry indicates that high and discrimi-
natory prices result from the existence of 
monopoly power among publishers. Uni-
versity and library administrators canal-
leviate this problem in several ways: (1) 
by providing journal users with an incen-
tive for keeping prices lower; (2) by en-
couraging library organizations and uni-
versity consortia to exploit their poten-
tial monopsony (i.e., a buying monopoly) 
power into a bilateral monopoly situa-
tion; and (3) by attempting to create and 
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demonstrate high elasticity of demand for 
journals in any way possible. Even if 
some degree of price discrimination is jus-
tified by consumer equity considerations, 
the current pricing situation is far from 
equitable and can be improved if publish-
ers can be coerced to change their pricing 
practices. Meanwhile, efficiency and re-
source allocation considerations, which 
are usually of the utmost importance to 
"normative" economists (i.e., those inter-
ested in efficient use of society's re-
sources), appear to favor holding journal 
prices to libraries down to levels close to 
marginal production cost (including a 
reasonable profit) in order to promote the 
shared usage that takes place in libraries 
as opposed to printing an individual copy . 
for each user. Journal price inflation has 
exceeded greatly the rate of increase in 
the consumer price index in the past quar-
ter century. There is evidence that the 
greatest extent of high markups and price 
discrimination is centered in a few com-
mercial publishing firms, primarily lo-
cated in Western Europe, and in a few dis-
ciplines.61-65 The pricing practices and 
profitability of these firms need to be ex-
plored further to determine whether there 
is any cost-based justification for their 
high prices and to develop a more com-
plete understanding of the journal price 
problem, for recent data show that the 
problem is not simply going to disap-
pear.66 Nor should society expect that to 
happen. 
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